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Highlights
• Discrete choice and product space demand models estimated on ADHD sales data
• Choice sets include substitutes and complements
• We compare substitution patterns and predicted price changes under mergers
• Magnitudes are larger for nested-AIDS compared to discrete choice demand
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Abstract
We use ADHD drugs sales data from 2000-2003 and compare estimates of elasticities and merger simulations
from three different demand models. Models include logit, random coefficients logit, and conditional AIDS
demand model with multistage budgeting. The magnitude of cross-price elasticities is larger in the third
model in comparison to the first two, and some of the cross-price elasticities are estimated to be negative.
Hypothetical merger simulations show larger price effects for the multistage AIDS model in comparison to
the discrete choice models.
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1. Introduction
Competition authorities are increasingly supplementing traditional merger analysis with quantita-
tive methods using demand models and merger simulations. In principle, the analysis is a straight-
forward three-step process: use pre-merger data to estimate demand parameters, recover marginal
costs using equilibrium conditions, and then simulate the merger via joint profit maximization of
the merging parties. At the heart of this methodology is demand estimation, which is used to obtain
price elasticities. The two classes of demand models, continuous/product space or discrete choice,
offer tradeoffs in terms of allowing flexibility of substitution patterns and data requirements. For
instance, the continuous choice models are usually easier to estimate when there are relatively few
products. On the other hand, discrete choice models can handle a large number of products but
are better suited when the alternatives under consideration are substitutes. These models force
substitution patterns among choices to be positive, i.e., all alternatives are gross substitutes due to
the assumption that a consumer can choose only one alternative.1 By comparison, demand models
estimated in the product space do not impose this restriction, but are generally estimated with less
precision if there is not enough price variation and/or if there are too many products. In turn, these
differences in substitution patterns may be important for estimating marginal costs and mark-ups
for merger simulations. We highlight this inherent tradeoff by estimating models from both classes
using sales data from a segment of drugs where some of them can be used jointly and hence exhibit
complementarities.
A typical continuous choice model is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980). It allows for a flexible substitution pattern but the number of parameters to
be estimated increases in the square of number of products. For this reason it is sometimes esti-
mated within the context of multistage budgeting, which helps to reduce the parameters problem
(Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 1994). In the second class of models, logit and its extensions have
been popular for demand estimation with aggregate data (Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005). Since logit
imposes a substitution pattern that suffers from the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
problem, much attention has been given in the academic literature to allow for correlations in prefer-
ences over attributes which has lead to the more general random coefficients logit model, attributed
to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (also called the ‘BLP’ model). However, substitutability
1When there are complementarities or bundling, discrete choice models on aggregate data can still be employed by removing
the constraint that a consumer must buy only one product. Nevo, Rubinfeld and McCabe (2005) provide an example of a
random coefficients logit model where individual libraries buy all journals above a threshold until they exhaust their budget.
For another example of accounting for complementarities see Gentzkow (2007). Consumer choice can be modeled as A, B or
A&B and similar other combinations for multiple choices when products are bundled together (see Fox and Lazzati (2016)
for identifying restrictions in such a case). Minjae, Nicholson and Lucarelli (2017) use discrete choice methods to handle such
combinations in the context of choice of cancer drugs. To model the combined choice of A&B relative to A and B individually,
one either needs data on individual choices so as to construct shares of A&B relative to A or B alone, or other assignment
rules, as was the case in their work.
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between products is not a condition that holds in all markets. In the case of drugs, those within
the same therapeutic class, but differing by active ingredient or by formulation, may in fact be
jointly consumed to form a complete therapeutic regime (“cocktail”), for instance for HIV or cancer
drugs. There are many situations where complementarity is the result of bundling. Armstrong
(2013) shows under which conditions this can happen, and gives examples. If this is the case, then
estimating a discrete choice model, even a sophisticated one that overcomes the IIA problems, may
still be committing a specification error unless complementarities are accounted for.
There are some examples where discrete choice models have been used to estimate demand for drugs,
but where it is possible that some patients may be using the products in combinations. Bjo¨rnerstedt
and Verboven (2016) estimate a discrete choice model to evaluate post-merger prices in the Swedish
market for pain killers. Patients sometimes combine or stagger 6-8hr dosages of ibuprofen (Advil or
Motrin) with acetaminophen (Tylenol) to get pain relief or to keep the fever down over the course
of the day. Due to combination therapy such drugs may be gross complements (see Hay et al.,
2008, Mayoral et al., 2000). Similarly, Weinberg (2011) estimates logit and nested logit models to
compare pre- and post- merger prices in feminine protection products in the US. The acquisition
was by Proctor and Gamble, which was the leading seller of sanitary pads (Whisper and Always) of
Tambrand’s tampon product (Tampax). In the analysis the sanitary pads and tampons are treated
as (weak) substitutes and placed in different nests. However, for some part of the population it is
a recognised practice to use these products together. As a final example, consider Duso, Herr and
Suppliet (2014) who estimate a nested logit model for Type II anti-diabetes drugs using aggregate
sales data in Germany. This segment consists of many solo and combination active ingredients such
as metformin (a biguanide), rosiglitazone (a thiazolidinediones) or metformin and rosiglitazone joint
tablets (e.g., Avandamet). Indeed this possibility is explicitly recognised in the paper and accounted
for by including sales from combination tablets. However physicians also prescribe these (and other)
active ingredients as separate drugs to the same patient rather than only via combination tablets,
and such joint purchases would not be accounted for in aggregate sales data.2
We use aggregate sales data on psychostimulant drugs prescribed for treating symptoms of attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which differ by active ingredient (molecule) and formulation
(immediate release, extended release, etc.), and where the choice set consists of both gross com-
plements and substitutes. To see why, note that ADHD is primarily an adolescent disease where
children suffering from the disorder are often prescribed psychostimulant drugs to help them cope
with symptoms of ADHD during school hours, as well as provide some coverage in the late after-
noon/early evening. Differences in formulation imply differences in absorption rates of the drug in
the body, and hence differences in the effectiveness period of the drugs; four hours, six-eight hours,
2Several other possible combinations such as pioglitazone and glimepiride or the triple combinations such as metformin,
pioglitazone and exenatide do not seem to be included in the estimation either (see Abdul-Ghani et al., 2015, for examples of
triple combinations).
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or twelve hours (Conner, 2006). Thus, two drugs with the same active ingredient, produced either
by the same firm or by two competitors, may at first pass appear to be substitutes, they can in fact
be used in combination, where an 8-hr drug can be taken in the morning before going to school, and
followed up with a 4-hr formulation after school to provide coverage throughout the working day.
For some patients, the 8-hr/4-hr combination would be a complement, and may be a substitute for
the more expensive once a day 12-hr drug.
In this paper we estimate logit, random coefficients logit and AIDS with multistage budgeting
using standard techniques for those models and then simulate three mergers based on each of the
three demand models. The AIDS model is estimated with multistage budgeting using techniques
highlighted in Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). We use the methodology outlined in Nevo
(2000b) to estimate the logit and the random coefficients logit models. The current data was
previously used in a different context in Bokhari and Fournier (2013), and as our point of entry, we
use multilevel AIDS parameters from that paper. In all models, price is treated as an endogenous
variable and the same set of instruments is used to correct for the endogeneity bias, so as to put all
three models on equal footing. We use the ‘Hausman instruments’, i.e., after controlling for market
fixed effects, the price of a drug from another geographic market is used as an instrument for the
price in the current market.3
Our merger simulation results vis-a`-vis differences in logit and AIDS based simulations, are similar
to those observed in monte carlo studies of these models, which generally report higher simulated
prices in AIDS models. However, we add to the limited evidence on the relative performance
of these models using real sales data and extend the comparisons to include drugs that may be
used in combination as well as to comparisons with the random coefficients demand models (for
a review see Budzinski and Ruhmer (2010)). The substitution patterns, and the corresponding
merger simulations from the three models give strikingly different results. Demand estimates from
the random coefficients model appear to be reasonable, especially in comparison to the logit model,
as they overcome the IIA restrictions. Also, (mean) own price elasticities are greater than one in
magnitude. However, these results are at odds with those from the AIDS model where several drugs
appear to be gross complements, and cross-price elasticities are much larger in magnitude. This
complementarity result is robust to several alternative specifications of the AIDS model and does not
appear to be simply due to an aggregation bias in the data. Further, the estimated complementary
makes intuitive sense as it appears among very specific drugs: those within the same molecule –
but differing by formulation and coverage described above – but not across different molecules.4
3The use of such instruments has been criticised in the literature, most famously by Bresnahan (1997), and certainly the
estimates given here may also be subject to potential common demand side shocks criticism, but the point here is that the
same price instruments are used in all three models so as to be able to compare them.
4An aggregation bias could arise when different members of a household purchase alternative products over the same
purchase period, for instance regular pancake syrup for some members of the household and light pancake syrup for those with
diabetes. While light and regular syrups may be unrelated in demand for individuals, they would appear as complements in
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature on
demand estimation methods and on merger simulations. Section three describes the product market
and the data. Section four outlines the model specification in the context of our data. Section five
contains three types of results: selected regression coefficients, elasticity matrices, and simulated
price changes under hypothetical mergers from each of the three demand models and for three
different hypothetical mergers. The last section concludes.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Demand Models. Earlier empirical work involving demand models used product space ap-
proach, and focused on specifying demand systems that were consistent with the utility maximiza-
tion problem of a representative consumer, met the requirements for aggregating over consumers,
and allowed for flexible substitution patterns between products. Typical models include the Linear
Expenditure System (Stone, 1954, Barten, 1964), the Rotterdam model (Theil, 1965), the Translog
model (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1975), and the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS –
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), each with varying degree of flexibility in the substitution patterns.
However, a common difficulty in product space approach is the dimensionality problem: unless a
restrictive form is used, the number of demand system parameters increases in the square of the
number of products and estimation requires access to a very rich data set.
To reduce the dimensionality problem, Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) relied on weakly separa-
ble preferences of a representative consumer, along with other assumptions necessary to allow for a
multistage budgeting, to specify a series of demand systems at different levels. This method, which
has become popular in empirical industrial organization, involves estimating a multilevel system
consisting of, for instance, top, middle, and bottom level demand systems. The top level consists of
an overall demand for the segment (e.g. beer) while the middle and bottom levels specify flexible
forms such as AIDS or Cobb-Douglas demand equations for subgroups of products (foreign, domes-
tic, premium beers etc.), and then for individual brands (Miller Lite, Coors, Budweiser, etc.). Some
recent applications include Ellison et al. (1997), Hausman and Leonard (2002, 2005), Chaudhuri,
Goldberg and Jia (2006) and, Bokhari and Fournier (2013).
Alternatively, the distance metric approach developed in the spatial model by Pinkse, Slade and
Brett (2002) offers an alternative to multistage budgeting for handling a large number of parameters
by specifying the cross-price coefficients as function of distance between brands in the product space.
aggregate data. In our case of ADHD drugs, it would be if either multiple household members were diagnosed with ADHD,
and using different drug therapies, or since our data is aggregated over a year, if the same individual was using alternative
drugs during different parts of the year. While drug switches do happen soon after the initial diagnosis, so as to identify the
right molecule for the person vis-a-vis the effectiveness of the main molecule and any side effects, once the correct drug is
identified, it is difficult to imagine why the form would be different at different points in the year for the same individual.
Nonetheless, aggregation bias cannot be completely ruled out.
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Pinkse and Slade (2004) extend the method and apply it to the UK brewing industry, while Rojas
(2008) applies this method on the AIDS demand specification of the US beer industry.
While the product space is more natural in the sense that consumers have preferences over prod-
ucts, the characteristics space approach due to Lancaster (1966) and McFadden (1973), and later
further developed by Berry (1994) in the context of aggregate demand, views products as bundles
of characteristics over which consumers have well defined preferences. Consumers (indirect) utility
is defined as a function of a few relevant characteristics of the product (some of which are not
observed by the econometrician), price and an idiosyncratic random error term. The characteristics
approach avoids the dimensionality problem since the parameters to be estimated do not increase
in the square of the number of products, or even by the number of products if the dimension of
relevant characteristics does not increase with the number of brands. Further when the error term
in the consumer’s random utility model is specified as a Type 1 extreme value that is independently
and identically distributed, it leads to the famous logit model but introduces the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem attributed to lack of correlations in consumer preferences over
products.
Allowing for correlations among groups of products, or more generally among preferences over
attributes, leads to the nested logit and the random coefficients logit models (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995, Cardell, 1997). Early applications, as well as important extensions with aggre-
gate sales data, include Verboven (1996), Nevo (2000a, 2001), Sudhir (2001), Ivaldi and Verboven
(2005), Petrin (2002) and Grigolon and Verboven (2014) among others. Despite the estimation
difficulties associated with the BLP model, such as the role of starting values in non-linear search
algorithms, choice of alternative optimization methods, accuracy of contraction mapping to invert
market shares, integration to obtain market shares, role of instruments, and under-identification of
variance parameters for the random components, random coefficients model has become the favorite
workhorse of much of modern demand estimation (see Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014), Dube´, Fox
and Su (2012), Skrainka and Judd (2011), Reynaert and Verboven (2014) and Moon, Shum and
Weidner (2014), respectively for advancements in work related to the aforementioned issues).
2.2. Merger Simulations. A comparison of merger simulated predictions with actual post-merger
prices, as well comparisons of different demand models in merger simulations, have both been
highlighted in the literature in the context of substitute goods (Crooke et al., 1999, Peters, 2006,
Huang, Rojas and Bass, 2008, Weinberg, 2011, Weinberg and Hosken, 2013, Miller et al., 2016, 2017,
Bjo¨rnerstedt and Verboven, 2016). In the latter group, i.e. comparisons across demand models,
Crooke et al. (1999) use monte carlo methods to generate data that equate equilibrium prices,
quantities and elasticities across four different demand models (AIDS, logit, linear and log-linear)
and use the specified demand parameters to predict post merger prices. They find that log-linear,
followed by AIDS models, gives the largest predicted post merger prices. Huang, Rojas and Bass
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(2008) also use monte carlo methods to generate data sets that correspond to each of the four
demand models above, but where data is calibrated so as to have the same elasticity matrix at
equilibrium prices. Since they include logit as one of the models, which can only have positive
cross-price elasticities, their calibration and model comparisons are in the context of substitute
goods. In this respect they incorporate estimating the ‘wrong’ model, i.e., a specification error,
since data generation may be from logit demand system while the estimated model may be AIDS
or vice versa. The authors find that the magnitude of the bias in the estimated elasticities varies
by the type of model, but that the logit model gives the best results in terms of merger predictions,
even when the true data generating process matches one of the other demand models.
Similarly, Miller et al. (2016, 2017) also use monte carlo methods and replicate earlier results of
model mis-specification in merger simulations, but extend the analysis to compare the predicted
price effects from ‘upward pricing pressure’ (UPP) methodology against merger simulations results
from the same four demand models listed above. In their design, AIDS, linear, and log-linear models
are all calibrated to match the initial elasticity matrix generated by the logit model. They find that
the UPP methodology price predictions are more accurate when demand estimation is based on
logit or linear models than the other two, where UPP under-predicts compared to the AIDS or
log-linear price simulations.
Finally, and most closely related to this paper, Weinberg and Hosken (2013) use real pre- and
post-merger data from two product markets (breakfast syrup and motor oil), where a handful of
substitute goods were available, and a merger was observed in each case. They investigate differences
in predicted post-merger prices based on linear, AIDS and two variants of logit models and also
compare the predictions to the actual post-merger prices. The authors report that generally the
models under-predicted the change in prices for the motor oil market, where true price changes
were large, but over predicted change in prices for the breakfast syrup market, where the true price
changes were negligible. Moreover, they find that the magnitude of predicted price change for the
AIDS model was larger than for the logit models.
3. Product Market and Data
We use retail level sales data from the U.S. for psychostimulant drugs prescribed for the treatment of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). These drugs are differentiated not just by the main
active ingrediant/molecule, but also by the specific form of the drug. Within each molecule, drugs
are available as immediate-release (IR) or extended-release (ER) forms, where the main difference
is in absorbtion rates, time to peak effects, and importantly, how many times a day the drug needs
to be administered as some have a 4-hour effect, and typically need to be taken upto three times a
day, while others can last 8 or 12 hours and require fewer dosing regimes per day.
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The data set used in this analysis consists of annual sales (quantities and revenues) between 2000 and
2003 of all ADHD drugs, and was drawn from NDCHealth’s proprietary Source Territory Manager
files. Quantity is provided by weight (total number of pills times the strength in milligrams of the
active ingredient), and revenue is the nominal dollar value received by all pharmacies in a ZIP code
for a given drug from all payers (copay plus any third party payments such as via insurance). Data
was aggregated up to the county level, all dollar values were converted to constant 2000 dollars
using the CPI, and price was derived as revenue divided by quantity. The analysis is restricted to
counties in 778 metropolitan statistical areas as zero sales were often observed in rural counties.
Table 1 lists the names, manufacturers, and classifications (molecules and forms) of all ADHD drugs
that were on the market during the study period. By 2003 there were 16 branded products available
in the market along with generics for many expired patents, spanning across three main molecules:
methylphenidate-HCL (MPH), mixed amphetamine salts (MAS), and dextroamphetamines (DEX).
Two other molecules (pemoline and provigil) are not first line ADHD drugs while another, (ato-
moxetine, brand name Strattera) is an FDA approved ADHD drug but is a non-stimulant and
introduced in the last year of the data series. These last three molecules are categorized as ‘other’
(OTH) molecules in the table. Within each molecule, drugs are sub-grouped based on their forms
IR, ER and XR which roughly correspond to hours coverage by a the given drug (4, 6-8 or 12 hours).
For instance, a tablet of Ritalin, listed as MPH-IR, typically provides coverage of 4 hours while
Concerta, also in the same molecule but different form (MPH-XR), provides a 12 hours coverage.
Note that these drugs cannot be substituted on a gram-for-gram basis, especially those is different
sub-groups, and hence some dosage equivalence is needed so that one can compare price per dosage
across different drugs rather than price per gram. For instance, a child who is taking 100mg of
Concerta over a period of time, if switched to Ritalin (MPH-IR) would have a change in dosage to
69mg over the same period, and hence it makes sense to compare price of 100mg of Concerta to
price of 69mg of Ritalin rather than to 100mg of Ritalin. The dosage conversion factors to MPH-IR
are given in parenthesis in front of the name of drug.5 Using dosage conversion factor between
MPH-IR and other drugs, and World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition for defined daily
dosage (DDD) for MPH-IR (30mg as DDD or 0.9 grams per month), we have converted the total
quantity for any given drug to defined monthly dosage (DMD). Thus if total quantity of Concerta
sold in a year is X grams, it becomes (.69X/.9) DMD. Similarly, average price of Concerta, which
in 2003 was $73.94 per gram (in constant 2000 dollars) becomes 73.94×.9/.69 = $96.45 per DMD
(in 2000 constant dollars). Table 1 provides the average price and shares by revenue and quantity
(post DMD adjustment) for two selected years.
5The conversion factors were compiled by Professor Steve Hinshaw (UC Berkeley) and Dr. Peter Levine (pediatrician
with Kaiser Permanente of Northern California) and are similar to the grouping given in Conner (2006). We are indebted to
Professor Hinshaw and Dr. Levine for providing us with the equivalence table.
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Table 1. Average Prices and Shares
2000 2003
Product Firm Price Share Share Price Share Share
(Rev) (Qty) (Rev) (Qty)
MPH-IR (∼4hrs)
1-Ritalin (1.0) Novartis 47.99 0.081 0.056 52.41 0.009 0.010
2-Methylin (1.0) Mallinckrodt 37.68 0.068 0.058 31.81 0.013 0.023
3-Generic MPH-IR (1.0) 19 firms 37.40 0.185 0.163 33.06 0.026 0.046
MPH-ER (∼8hrs)
4a-Ritalin SR (0.83) Novartis 66.56 0.032 0.016 76.44 0.003 0.002
4b-Ritalin LA (1.25) Novartis . 57.25 0.024 0.025
5a-Metadate CD (1.25) Celltech . 56.22 0.024 0.024
5b-Metadate ER (0.83) Celltech 65.33 0.007 0.003 66.11 0.002 0.002
6-Methylin ER (0.83) Mallinckrodt 58.41 0.004 0.002 52.29 0.006 0.007
7-Generic MPH-ER (0.83) 15 firms 52.78 0.080 0.051 48.12 0.008 0.009
MPH-XR (∼12hrs)
8-Concerta (0.69) Ortho-McNeil 110.33 0.047 0.014 96.45 0.261 0.158
MAS-IR (∼4hrs)
9-Adderall (2.86) Shire 19.86 0.311 0.497 31.87 0.029 0.053
10-Generic MAS-IR (2.86) 3 firms . 26.52 0.076 0.164
MAS-XR (∼12hrs)
11-Adderall XR (2.14) Shire . 52.58 0.238 0.259
DEX-IR (∼4hrs)
12-Dexedrine (1.75) Glaxo Smith Kline 27.36 0.010 0.012 34.94 0.002 0.003
13-Dextrostat (1.75) Shire 23.59 0.018 0.024 23.25 0.002 0.004
14-Generic DEX-IR (1.75) 4 firms . 24.62 0.004 0.009
DEX-ER (∼8hrs)
15-Dexedrine SR (2.14) Glaxo Smith Kline 32.08 0.062 0.063 40.25 0.007 0.010
16-Generic DEX-ER (2.14) 2 firms . 35.14 0.011 0.018
OTH
17a-Cylert (0.44) Abbott Laboratories 85.89 0.023 0.009 90.06 0.002 0.001
17b-Provigil(0.28) Cephalon, Inc 79.13 0.059 0.025 89.85 0.094 0.061
17c-Generic Pemoline (0.44) 8 firms 64.76 0.015 0.008 60.49 0.004 0.004
17d-Strattera (0.83) Eli Lilly . . 83.59 0.156 0.108
Notes Prices are per unit of defined monthly dosage (DMD). The number in parenthesis in
front of the name of the drugs is the conversion factor used for converting to generic MPH-IR
equivalent dosage.
Due to some data limitations, in the analysis that follows we treat certain drugs as one combined
product. Within each molecule-form combination, generic drugs by different manufacturers are
combined into a singe drug. For instance, in 2003 there were 19 separate manufacturers for the
generic version of MPH-IR (i.e., generic version of Ritalin), and we combine the sales data from
these different generic producers and treat them as one product. There are two reasons why generics
within a molecule-form are treated as one product. First, individual manufactures for generics are
identifiable in this data series for only the last two years, and treating these products as separate
would significantly limit the number of useable observations (from four years to two years). Second,
within a specific market (county-year), collectively the generics have positive sales, but individually
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several products have zero sales – in 2003 the average share of the 19 MPH-IR generics collectively
was 2.6% but individually in any given county many had zero sales. Since price is computed as
revenue divided by quantity, price of an individual generic product cannot be ascertained for that
county-year. This poses a serious estimation challenge for product space based models, such as AIDS
specification, where share of a product in a market is a function of not only own price, but price of
all other products. Just to be clear, treating generics separately implies that the share equation for
Ritalin would need to be specified as a function of own price, price of 15 other branded products,
and price of 49 (=15+19+3+4+8) generics. If the price of even a single generic is not available for
the county-year combination (since sales for it were zero in that county-year), then no data from
that county-year can be used in the analysis (and may lead to sample selection problems). Combine
that with the earlier mentioned limitation of total two years of identifiable generic manufactures,
and estimation is nearly impossible.
Note also that this issue of unknown price when quantity/share is zero in a county-year is equally
problematic in discrete choice methods. For instance, in a logit specification, share is a function of
own price and not the price of other products, but a county-year market has as many ‘observations’
(share-price combinations) as the number of products (think of data set in ‘long-form’). This means
that if the price is unknown, the share-price combination is not available for that county-year, and
hence the total length of the panel is varying not due to varying choice set per market, which
would be fine if the specific generic was not available in the market, but is changing because no
one purchased that drug even though it is available and correct estimation would require zero share
with a positive known price.
For somewhat similar reasons, we treat Novartis’s Ritalin SR and Ritalin LA as one drug and
Celltech’s ER and CD as one drug (Novartis phased out SR tablet and introduced LA capsule and
Celltech used a similar strategy). Finally drugs listed as ‘OTH’ are also treated as one product so
that the final data set used for the alternative demand estimation analysis consists of 17 different
products.
4. Model Specification
4.1. Model 1: Standard Logit/Homegenous Tastes. The logit assumes that there is no vari-
ation in tastes across patients and hence the indirect utility for consumer n for product j in market
t (county-year combination) is given by
unjt = αn(yn − pjt) + xjtβn + ξjt + njt, where
n = 1, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T and where
βn = β, αn = α, for all N.
(1)
9
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Note that homogenous tastes are due to the assumption that βn = β and αn = α for all N . In the
equation above, 0 refers to the ‘outside good’, chosen when the patient does not purchase any of
the products. The vector xjt (of dimension k − 1) and random variable ξjt are the observed and
unobserved (to the econometrician) product characteristics that do not vary over consumers. The
former consists of molecule and form of the drug (in our case k− 1 = 6), while the latter is a scalar
index due to pack variety, expiration date or other unobservable characteristics related to quality.6
The utility function in (1) can be written compactly as
unjt = αyn + δjt + njt (2)
where δjt ≡ α(−pjt) + xjtβ + ξjt is the mean utility for product j in market t. For the logit model,
we assume that njt are independently and identically distributed (iid) and follow a Type-1 extreme
value distribution given by F () = exp(− exp(−)). In this case, the market share of product j is
sjt(δt) =
∫
Ajt
dF () =
exp(δjt)∑J
l=0 exp(δlt)
(3)
where Ajt is the set of characteristics of individuals that choose brand j in market t. The outside
option (described below) is normalized by assuming that the price and other characteristics are zero
for product 0 (i.e., un0t = αyn + n0t and δ0t = 0) and hence the share equation can be transformed
so that
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = δjt ≡ α(−pjt) + xjtβ + ξjt (4)
can be estimated using linear regression methods. Given estimates of model parameters θ1 =[
α β′
]′
, elasticity of product j with respect to price of product k in market t can be computed as
ηjkt =
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
=
−αpjt(1− sjt) if j = k,αpktskt otherwise. (5)
For markets where the outside good has a large share (so that 1− sjt is small), this makes the own
price elasticity to be nearly proportional to the price of the product. Also, the cross-price elasticity
of product j with respect to product k depends only the market share of k, and not of all other
products, i.e., it exhibits the IIA property.
Outside Good. To estimate the model in (4), we need a measure of s0, i.e., share of the outside
good. In 2003, approximately 9.5% of school aged children (age groups 4-19 years) were diagnosed
with ADHD, along with a much smaller percentage of adults, and of these approximately only 60%
were on ADHD medication (see Bokhari and Schneider, 2011). Thus we take total consumption of
all ADHD drugs in a given market, and divide it by .1*.6 times the number of school aged children
in that market to compute an approximate consumption rate. Next, to compute the potential size
6There are four molecules and three forms, each of which is specified as a dummy variable. Thus, with three dummies for
molecules, two for the form, and one intercept, k − 1 = 6. Also, we write the dimension of vector xjt as k − 1 because later
we subsume the price variable in the matrix X which then has k = 7 columns.
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of the market, we assume that all of the diagnosed children (i.e., 100% of the 10% diagnosed), plus
an additional 1% of the adult population are candidates for drug therapy, and multiply the rate
above with this candidate population. In terms of quantity, this gives the (potential) market size to
vary from 2.01 to 2.90 times the observed total consumption in each county, with an average value
of 2.23 times the total consumption. Given the potential size of the market Mt, then based on the
observed values of q1t, . . . , qJt, the shares of the ‘inside’ goods s1t, . . . sJt are defined relative to this
value as
sjt = qjt/Mt j = 1, . . . , J for all t = 1, . . . , T (6)
and hence the share of the outside good per market is just s0t = 1 −
∑J
j=1 sjt for all t. This sets
the average outside share to 55.08% and varies between 50.33% and 65.54% across the markets.
For robustness checks, we repeated the calculation above but assumed that the true prevalence of
ADHD among children is 15%, i.e., an additional 5% are undiagnosed and that all of them could
potentially be prescribed ADHD medication plus the 1% of adult population. This increased the
average share of the outside good to 67.33% and that of the average market size to 3.06 times the
total consumption.7
Price Instruments. The error term in (4) is likely to be correlated with the prices so that
cov(pjt, ξjt) 6= 0 and hence as a first step towards consistent estimation, we estimate a fixed ef-
fects model with dummies for individual products and markets so that the equation becomes
ln(sjt) − ln(s0t) = δjt = α(−pjt) + xjtβ + ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt, where ξj is the brand fixed effect and
ξt is the market fixed effect. Since brand characteristics (molecule and form) do not change by
individual markets, those variables are dropped in favor of the brand dummies. Market fixed effects
are proxied with linear and quadratic time variables and dummies for state variables.
Once brand specific dummy variables are included in the regression, the error term is just the
market specific deviation from the mean of the unobserved characteristics. For instance local level
7We also computed the potential size and share of outside good in a very different manner but it led to such extreme values
of potential market and share of outside good that we did not use this alternative definition in our final analysis but report it
here briefly. We used a 12-hr (day-long) coverage of a standard dose of ADHD drug multiplied by candidate population in each
area as the total potential size of the market. According to WHO, a standard dose is a 30mg pill of MPH-IR (i.e., immediate
release tablet of methylphenidate such as Ritalin), and if taken three times a day it would provide a 12-hr coverage. Thus a
standard dose is 90mg of MPH-IR per day per person or 10.8 grams per year. We multiplied this dose with 15% of all school
aged children and 1% of adult population to compute the market size. If we reduce the population percentages, it produces
potential market size to be smaller than observed quantity in some markets (there is large cross-sectional variation in actual
consumption rates and indeed even in diagnosis). However keeping it at this value of population produces a share of outside
good that varies from 18.55% to 99.76% with an average value of 90%, and of market size that varies between 1.23 to 417.38
with an average value of 18.59 times total consumption. Results from such an extreme potential size market definition are
available upon request, but briefly, while they don’t change the regression coefficients or estimates of own-price elasticities by
much, they make the cross-price elasticity estimates smaller by an order of magnitude (see formula for logit price elasticities to
see why). Following on from that, merge simulations also show considerably smaller impact on price changes for competitors’
products.
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variation in pack variety or local promotions, and may still require the use of instruments for
price if E(∆ξjtpjt|xjt, ξj, ξt) = 0 does not hold. Accordingly, we use instruments originally due to
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). They use the panel nature of data and the assumption that
prices in different areas are correlated via common cost shocks, to use a price vector from other
city as instrument for the price vector in a given city. The identifying assumption is that after
controlling for brand specific intercepts and demographics, the city specific valuations of a product
are independent across cities but may be correlated within a city over time. Given this assumption,
the price of a brand in another city is a valid instrument, so that price of brand j in two cities will
be correlated due to the common marginal cost, but due to the independence assumption will be
uncorrelated with the market specific valuation of the product. Since our data is at county level,
we use the average price of a given drug from 20 randomly selected counties that are not from the
same census region as the original county (so as to minimize the possibility of common demand side
shocks).8
4.2. Model 2: Random Coefficients Logit/Heterogenous Tastes. For the heterogenous con-
sumer case, the general set up of utility for consumer n for product j in market t is as in (1), but
without imposing the restriction that taste parameters {α,β} – the marginal utilities of product
characteristics – are the same for all consumers. Instead each consumer is assumed to have a differ-
ent set of coefficients {αn,βn} which are modeled as a function of underlying common parameters
{Π, Σ} that are multiplied to the person specific characteristics (dn,νn). These include observable
demographic information as well as other unobservable characteristics such as physiology, type of
ADHD, and school circumstances (e.g. presence of a school nurse that can administer medication
during school hours if a child is taking multiple doses of 4-hr drugs within a day) that may effect
the choice of drug. Thus (dn,νn) are random draws from a mean zero population with distribution
functions Fd(d) and Fν(ν), and [
αn
βn
]
=
[
α
β
]
︸︷︷︸
θ1
+ Πdn + Σνn︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2={Π,Σ}
.
(7)
The person specific coefficients are equal to the mean value of the parameters θ1 =
[
α β′
]′
, plus
deviation from the mean due to a second set of parameters θ2 = {Π,Σ} and given by Πdn + Σνn.
Note that Π is k ×D matrix of parameters and Σ is k × k matrix of parameters.
8A commonly used alternative is to employ the ‘BLP instruments’, i.e., sums of characteristics of other products produced
by the same firm or by other competing firms. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) made the argument that changes in
exogenous characteristics of competing products should help identify substitution patterns. However, as explained in Berry
and Haile (2014), while these instruments are useful, they are not sufficient to alone identify demand and require additional
instruments, such as cost shifters or cost proxies (i.e. prices from other markets as in the case of Hausman instruments).
What prevents us from using these instruments is that, as mentioned above, we have a short panel and the fact that drug
characteristics are the same in all markets, and hence there is no variation in observed product characteristics across markets
that can be exploited.
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If we insert (7) back into (1) and simplify, then the utility function can be decomposed into three
parts (or four, if we count αnyn term but that drops out later on) and can be written as
unjt = αnyn + δjt + µnjt + njt where,
δjt = δ(xjt, pjt, ξjt;θ1) = α(−pjt) + xjtβ + ξjt
µnjt = µ(xjt, pjt,dn,νn;θ2) = (−pjt,xjt)(Πdn + Σνn).
(8)
As before, δjt is the mean utility of drug j and is common to all patients, and µnjt + njt is the
mean-zero heteroscedastic error term that captures the deviation from the mean utility. The market
share of product j is the integral of the joint distribution of (d, ν, ) over the mass of individuals
in region Ajt,
sjt =
∫
Ajt
dF (d, ν, ) =
∫
Ajt
dFd(d)dFν(ν)dF() (9)
where the second part follows only if we assume that the three random variables for a given consumer
are independently distributed. If we continue to assume that njt is iid and drawn from extreme
value distribution, then the probability that a given individual n – with endowed values of dn
and νn, or equivalently with a given value of µnjt – chooses product j has the usual logit form
given by snjt = exp(δjt + µnjt)/
∑J
j=0 exp(δjt + µnjt). Integrating this individual probability over a
distribution of dn and νn recovers the market share of product j.
To obtain the model predicted market shares, we use census data and randomly select 40 adults
from each MSA and year and record their vector of demographics dn (income, health insurance,
family size and race (white or not)) to construct a non-parametric distribution for Fd(d). Next, for
Fν(ν), we use a multivariate normal distribution and numerically compute the market share via
the smooth simulator. Specifically, given Ns = 40 random draws for (νn,dn) for each market t, and
an initial guess of mean utility and parameters θ2 = {Π,Σ}, model predicted market share s˜jt is
obtained as
s˜jt =
∫
Ajt
snjtdFd(d)dFν(ν) =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n
snjt =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n
{ exp(δjt + µnjt)∑J
l=0 exp(δlt + µnlt)
}
. (10)
The model parameters (θ1,θ2) are estimated using Berry’s two step GMM method. Briefly, given
the random draw and starting values of θ2, first we obtain an estimate of the mean utility δjt via
the contraction mapping
δh+1t = δ
h
t + [ln(st)− ln(s˜t)] (11)
that matches model predicted market shares s˜jt with the observed shares sjt for each market.
Next, we define the error term as ξ(θ1,θ2) = δ̂(s,θ2) − Xθ1, and given a suitable matrix of
instrumental variables Z (described below), search for values of (θ1,θ2) that minimize the GMM
objective function
ξ(θ1,θ2)
′ZΦZ′ξ(θ1,θ2) (12)
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where Φ is the GMM weighting matrix. The process is then repeated by computing new values of
individual and model predicted market shares. We implement the algorithm following Nevo (2000b)
and the computer code given therein.9
The price elasticities of market shares are also numerically estimated as
ηjkt =
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
=
−
pjt
sjt
∫
Ajt
αnsnjt(1− snjt)dFd(d)dFν(ν) if j = k,
pkt
sjt
∫
Ajt
αnsnjtsnktdFd(d)dFν(ν) otherwise.
(13)
Instruments Matrix. The instrument for price, as before, is the Hausman instrument and this
variable and the brand characteristics (or brand dummies if instead they are used) form the main
elements of the instruments matrix Z as the set of exogenous variables. Note however that the
exogenous brand characteristics (or brand dummies if they were part of X) plus the one additional
(Hausman) instrument for price will give exactly as many moment conditions as the number of
components of the parameter vector θ1. These would be enough in the linear logit case. However, in
the random coefficients case, we have to estimate additional k×D+k×k parameters of θ2 = {Π,Σ}
where, in our case, D = 4 is the number of person specific observed characteristics, and k = 7
is the length of person specific shock for each observed product characteristic (i.e. the product
characteristics with random coefficients).10 Estimating these additional parameters is not possible
unless we have additional k×D+ k× k moment conditions (see Moon, Shum and Weidner, 2014).
Since these additional parameters are due to the µn(·) = X(Πdn+Σνn) term in the utility function,
and involve interactions of the product characteristics with individual specific terms dn,νn, we use
the average over Ns individuals of these interaction terms as additional variables in the instruments
Z matrix.11
4.3. Model 3: Multistage Budgeting and AIDS. We can model a multistage budgeting system
for a representative consumer to estimate demand for the drugs as follows.12 At the top level (level
4), a representative patient decides how many units of ADHD drugs to consume as a function of
a price index for these drugs, her income and other demographics. At the next stage down (level
3), budget is allocated to choice of the four molecules. The next level further allocates the budget
9As pointed out in Nevo (2000b), the matrix X consisting of price and product characteristics enters the model twice, once
linearly via the term δ(), which is common to all individuals, and a second time non-linearly via µ() that allows for random
coefficients for product characteristics. Thus, X in each part can be written as X1 and X2, and these need not be the same
set of variables. We set X1 as price and brand dummies, and X2 as price and product characteristics.
10In general if we set some of the terms of the Π matrix to be zero, and also set the parameter matrix Σ to be diagonal,
it reduces the need for additional moment conditions from kD + k2 to g + k where g is the number of non-zero terms in Π.
11An alternative would be to obtain additional moment conditions via the use of the ‘optimal’ instruments, i.e., expected
value of derivatives of the error term with respect to the parameters vector (see equation 12 above), which in the context of
the BLP instruments have been shown to improve the estimation of random coefficients models (see Reynaert and Verboven,
2014).
12The multilevel AIDS model with ADHD data was estimated in Bokhari and Fournier (2013), and we use the parameter
estimates provided therein. Here we keep estimation details to a minimum, and refer an interested reader to the given citation.
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to the choice of the forms, and at level 1 the consumer chooses among specific brands or generics
within each molecule and form, conditional on the budget for the segment (see Figure 1).
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Concerta and Adderall XR during the study period.
Figure 1. Multilevel Budgeting
Specifically, if there are M molecules indexed by m, then within a molecule there are Fm forms
indexed by fm, and for a given molecule and form there are Jfm drugs indexed by jfm such that∑M
m
∑Fm
f
∑Jfm
j jfm = J is the total number of drugs (since we are describing a different demand
model here, some of the notation will be recycled, and should not be confused with its use in the
discrete choice models discussed earlier). Then the system of demand equations for each level are
Level 4: lnQt = A+B ln(It) +G lnPt + xtλ+ ζt
Level 3: ln(Qtm) = Am +Bm ln(yt) +
M∑
m′
Γmm′ lnPtm′ + xtmλm + ξtm
Level 2: utfm = afm + bfm ln(
ytm
Ptm
) +
Fm∑
f ′
gff ′m lnPtf ′m + xtfmλfm + µtfm
Level 1: stjfm = αjfm + βjfm ln(
ytfm
Ptfm
) +
Jfm∑
j′
γjj′fm lnPtj′fm + xtjfmλjfm + ϕtjfm .
(14)
Level 1 equations are in AIDS specification where stjfm is the (revenue) share of drug j in market
t in segment fm, which is a function of lnPtj′fm , the log price of all j
′ drugs in segment fm, as
well as a function of log ratio of ytfm and Ptfm , the total expenditure and a price index for the fm
segment respectively. Similarly, xtjfm and ϕtjfm represent other exogenous variables and the error
term that effect the shares of the drug. The next level up is also an AIDS specification where utfm
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is the share of the form f in molecule m in market t. Other variables have similar interpretations
where, note that the ‘price’ of form within a molecule (the term lnPtf ′m in level two equation) is the
same as the price index for that form in level 1 equation, and that the right hand side now includes
a price index for the molecule (i.e., the lnPtm term). Level 3 is specified as Cobb-Douglas demand
equations where ‘price’ of the molecule is the price index used at the previous level. Finally at the
top level, log quantity of all ADHD drugs is a function of the price index for these drugs, total
income and other demographic variables.
At each level the price index is constructed as the Stone price index, i.e., a share weighted average
of log price rather than Deaton and Muellbauer’s exact price.13 Thus at the bottom level, the index
for the price of molecule-form fm is computed as lnPtfm =
∑Jfm
j stjfm lnPtjfm .
The set of equations above also include exogenous variables that may effect shares or total quantity.
These are state fixed effects, time trends (up to cubic terms), (log of) number of children, number
of physicians, state level medicaid enrollees, and state medicaid expenditures on drugs. Each
segment is a system of equations and is estimated separately. At the lowest two levels, homogeneity,
symmetry and adding-up restrictions are imposed. In total there are five bottom level segments
with two or more drugs in them. At the next level up there are three separate segments with
multiple equations. For instance within the MPH segment, three equations are for IR, ER and
XR while within MAS there are just two equations. At the next level there is just one segment
with four equations (one for each molecule) and finally at the top level there is a single equation.
The equations were estimated using OLS and 3SLS where in the later case, prices are treated as
endogenous. The instrument used for prices (price from other markets) is the same as that used in
the earlier specified discrete choice models.
Based on estimated parameters, cross-price elasticity between two drugs i and k in molecule-form
segments fm and f
′
m′ respectively are given by
∂lnQifm
∂lnPkf ′
m′
=
(
1 +
βifm
sifm
)
s¯kf ′
m′
[gff ′
m′
ufm
+ u¯f ′
m′
]
· δm′m
+
(
1 +
βifm
sifm
)
s¯kf ′
m′
[bfmu¯f ′
m′
ufm
+ u¯f ′
m′
]
Γmm′ +
1
sifm
{
γikf ′
m′
− βifm s¯kf ′
m′
}
.δf
′m′
fm − δkf
′m′
ifm
(15)
where δba is the Kronecker delta function equal to 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.
13Note however that by using the Stone price index, even if the original prices were not endogenous, we are introducing an
artificial endogeneity, as equation (14) now involves shares on both the left and right hand side of the equation. This is easily
overcome by using period specific average value of shares from each county (average is over counties) to construct the price
index for market t. To be clear, right hand side in the Stone price index uses sjfm , i.e., period specific average share so that
each time period has a different value, but is the same for all counties. Higher level price indexes are constructed the same
way.
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5. Results
5.1. Regression Coefficients. Table 2 shows selected coefficients from the discrete choice models.
The first three columns show coefficients from simple logit. All three specifications include time,
time square, state fixed effects and log of number of children and log of number of physicians in the
area (county) as well as state medicaid expenditures on medication and total number of enrollees
in medicaid (both in logs). Specifications (1) and (2) are OLS results but in (1) we use drug
characteristics (molecule and form of the drug) while in (2) we instead use brand dummies. 14 Use
Table 2. Coefficients from Discrete Choice Models
Logit Random Coefficients Logit (4)
(1) (2) (3) θ1 θ2 (Interactions with Demographic Variables, pikd)
α, β α, β σkk Income Insurance Size Race
Price -2.074 -4.259 -8.755 -9.548 0.009 1.770 -7.023 0.765 -0.786
(0.067) (0.080) (0.155) (0.301) (0.070) (0.363) (1.703) (0.302) (0.664)
MPH -0.320 -0.418 -0.267 -0.246 -0.131 0.081 0.633 -0.186 -0.769
(0.031) (0.851) (0.880) (0.055) (0.064) (0.124) (0.320) (0.0980 (0.245)
MAS 0.838 0.740 0.936 1.616 -0.253 0.161 -2.158 -0.074 -0.754
(0.034) (0.852) (0.881) (0.064) (0.221) (0.143) (0.600) (0.107) (0.270)
DEX -1.542 -1.640 -1.455 1.161 -0.194 0.509 0.018 -0.179 0.452
(0.034) (0.852) (0.880) (0.058) (0.125) (0.144) (0.618) (0.101) (0.304)
ER -0.299 -0.299 -0.322 -1.477 -0.084 -0.420 -0.748 -0.200 0.644
(0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.055) (0.094) (0.074) (0.390) (0.058) (0.146)
XR 1.351 1.351 1.265 0.125 -0.071 -0.931 0.814 -0.563 0.609
(0.036) (0.029) (0.034) (0.022) (0.188) (0.179) (0.586) (0.176) (0.348)
Constant -1.253 -1.253 -1.327 -3.819 -0.018 -0.478 4.103 -0.010 0.167
(1.053) (0.850) (0.878) (0.055) (0.033) (0.188) (0.986) (0.131) (0.339)
Note: Table shows coefficients associated with price from simple logit (1,2,3) and random
coefficients logit model (4). (1) is OLS without brand dummies, (2) is OLS with brand dummies,
(3) is instrumental variables and brand dummies. Logits (1,2,3) also include other market
specific variables and state dummies (not shown). Standard errors are in parenthesis below the
coefficients. Price coefficients in this table are when price is in $100 per DMD, i.e., divided by
100, as some scaling was necessary to overcome convergence issues in estimating the random
coefficients logit model.
of brand dummies nearly doubles the value of the price coefficient. Specification (3) uses brand
14In columns 2,3, and 4, coefficients and standard errors for brand characteristics are retrieved via GLS regression of brand
dummies on brand characteristics.
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dummies and instruments for price and once again the coefficient nearly doubles from its previous
value. This general increase in the magnitude of the price coefficient is consistent with several
previous studies that show a similar effect of including brand dummies and use of instruments (see
for instance Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002)).
Specification (4) with random coefficients uses the Hausman instrument for prices and includes
both the brand dummies and drug characteristics. This model shows a further small increase in the
mean value of the price coefficient (-9.548). However, the coefficient on the standard deviation for
price is not significant but those on the interaction term between price and income, insurance and
family size are all statistically significant (though the interaction with race is not), indicating that
most of the heterogeneity in price sensitivity is explained via demographics. The large dispersion
in price sensitivity across individuals is shown in Figure 2. Similarly, the estimates for the standard
deviations of taste parameters are not significant for any of the brand characteristics except for
the dummy variable for the molecule MPH (and marginally for DEX at the 10 percent significance
level). However, several interactions between characteristics and demographics are significant. Thus,
relative to the other molecule, marginal utility of the MPH molecule increases with insurance but
decreases with family size, with similar interpretations for other coefficients.
Figure 2. Distribution of Price Coefficient
While the price coefficients across these discrete choice models can be compared, it is not possible
to directly compare them to a similar set of coefficients from the multistage AIDS specifications
as there is no one price coefficient to compare them to as each equation within each segment has
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several price coefficients (see the terms γjj′fm , gff ′m etc. in equations (14) which all correspond to
price coefficients). Nonetheless, we provide below coefficients on the price and segment expenditure
variables from one specific middle level segment – level 2, the three forms within molecule MPH
– as estimates from this segment best highlight the important differences across discrete choice
models when compared to product space models. To be clear, the selected segment is MPH and
the set of three share equations u1, u2 and u3 are for shares of MPH-IR, MPH-ER and MPH-XR
(i.e., the 4-hr, 8-hr and 12-hr drugs respectively) within the methylphenidate class. Together they
form a system of equations that can be estimated jointly via SUR or 3SLS, and with or without
any restrictions implied by micro theory (adding up, homogeneity and symmetry).
Table 3. Selected Regression Coefficients for MPH Segment
(i) (ii) (iii)
u1 u2 u3 u1 u2 u3 u1 u2 u3
ln(y/P ) -0.029 -0.006 0.036 -0.016 0.006 0.010 -0.024 -0.001 0.025
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.007) (.003) (.002) (.004)
ln p1 -0.007 0.01 -0.003 -0.182 -0.008 0.191 -0.365 -0.170 0.536
(.018) (.017) (.023) (.170) (.154) (.251) (.135) (.048) (.118)
ln p2 -0.044 -0.061 0.105 -0.032 -0.136 0.168 -0.170 -0.246 0.416
(.022) (.021) (.028) (.085) (.077) (.126) (.048) (.040) (.057)
ln p3 0.078 0.032 -0.11 0.794 0.610 -1.40 0.536 0.416 -0.952
(.019) (.018) (.024) (.173) (.157) (.255) (.118) (.057) (.126)
Note: u1, u2, u3 are share equations for MPH-IR, MPH-ER and MPH-XR respectively and
p1, p2, p3 are prices of these three forms. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Specification (i)
is SUR and does not impose homogeneity or symmetry restrictions, (ii) is GMM/IV and does
not impose homogeneity or symmetry restriction and (iii) is GMM/IV and imposes both sets
of restrictions. All regressions include state dummies, variables for time and time square plus
additional variables at area level.
Results are summarized in Table 3. The first set of estimates for the three forms are under the
columns marked as (i) and are from SUR estimation and without imposing any cross-equation
restrictions. The second group of estimates (under ii) are estimated via 3SLS estimator but without
imposing any restrictions. The final set of estimates (labeled iii) additionally impose homogeneity
and symmetry restrictions. The restriction test has a chi-square value of 8.36 with three degrees
of freedom for a p-value of 0.039. Thus, the restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance
level, and hence we take this as the preferred specification since without it does not make much
theoretical sense.
An important result in this table is the negative coefficient on price of MPH-ER (p2) in the equa-
tion for MPH-IR and the coefficient on price of MPH-IR (p1) in the the equation for MPH-ER
(for instance, in specification (iii) these are -0.170 and significant) implying that these forms are
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complements rather than substitutes. By comparison, both forms are substitutes for the third form
MPH-XR, and in turn that form is a substitute for each of these first two forms (positive coefficients
of 0.536 and 0.416 respectively). Since the dependent variables in each of these equations are rela-
tive shares, and not log quantities, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities. Table (4)
gives the conditional (level 2) Hicksian elasticities for this segment, which shows the complemen-
tarity between IR and ER drugs, and are calculated from the estimates from 3SLS with restrictions
(estimates are significantly different from zero).
Table 4. MPH Hicksian Elasticities
(A) (B) (C)
(A) MPH-IR -1.66 -0.33 1.99
(B) MPH-ER -0.61 -2.16 2.77
(C) MPH-XR 1.38 1.03 -2.41
Our conjecture is that the complementarities arise because the 4-hr and 8-hr drugs can be used in
combination within a day to provide a day long coverage: a child can be given an 8-hr medication
to last them through the school and then be given an additional dosage in early evening to provide
coverage for the rest of the day. Taken together the two form a substitute group for the more
expensive day long 12-hr drug (i.e., Concerta). This general sign pattern – complementarities
between MPH-IR and MPH-ER and substitution with MPH-XR – is robust across a number of
alternative specifications (and is reported elsewhere, see Bokhari and Fournier (2013)). We compare
the substitution patterns across all drugs in the next section.
5.2. Substitution Patterns. Tables (5) provides average values of own- and cross-price elasticities
of the first 11 drugs based on estimates for the discrete choice models (3) and (4), and where the
average is over the 778 markets. Elasticities from the multinomial logit are given in the top part
of the table. Since for the logit model cross-price elasticity for a given drug with respect to the
price of any other drug is the same across all drugs (due to the IIA property), for this model we
do not list the full matrix, but rather just two rows showing the own- and cross-price elasticity for
each drug. The lower part of the table lists elasticities from the random coefficients logit model,
including all the cross-price elasticities as they are not the same with respect to other drugs.
In the class of discrete choice logit models, the price coefficient α increased across the four speci-
fications from -2.07 in specification (1) to -9.55 in specification (4). Consequently, the magnitudes
of own- and cross-price elasticities also increase across these models. Further, model (4) overcomes
the IIA limitation, leading to generally higher cross-price elasticities within a molecule-form class
when compared to the simple logit models with homogenous taste parameters. The substitution
patterns in (4) seem reasonable to the extent that the degree of substitutability varies by molecule
and form.
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Table 5. Elasticities from Discrete Choice Models (3 and 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Logit (Model 3)
Own -4.24 -3.00 -2.95 -5.57 -4.81 -4.80 -4.35 -8.14 -2.16 -2.27 -4.04
Cross 0.053 0.055 0.139 0.036 0.037 0.013 0.054 0.412 0.315 0.163 0.315
Random Coefficients Logit (Model 4)
MPH-IR (4hr drugs)
(1) -4.50 0.074 0.188 0.040 0.044 0.015 0.061 0.406 0.356 0.197 0.240
(2) 0.071 -3.41 0.193 0.041 0.047 0.016 0.065 0.420 0.364 0.201 0.305
(3) 0.072 0.077 -3.34 0.041 0.047 0.016 0.065 0.420 0.365 0.201 0.302
MPH-ER (8hr drugs)
(4) 0.055 0.058 0.146 -5.50 0.040 0.014 0.054 0.397 0.300 0.172 0.288
(5) 0.056 0.062 0.155 0.038 -5.04 0.015 0.058 0.418 0.316 0.179 0.328
(6) 0.057 0.062 0.157 0.038 0.045 -5.10 0.058 0.415 0.318 0.180 0.327
(7) 0.060 0.067 0.170 0.039 0.046 0.016 -4.89 0.414 0.335 0.182 0.348
MPH-XR (12hr drugs)
(8) 0.043 0.048 0.118 0.034 0.038 0.013 0.047 -7.18 0.269 0.157 0.308
MAS-IR (4hr drugs)
(9) 0.060 0.064 0.162 0.036 0.039 0.014 0.058 0.385 -2.20 0.186 0.287
(10) 0.031 0.044 0.093 0.045 0.065 0.016 0.029 0.570 0.160 -2.35 0.446
MAS-XR (12hr drugs)
(11) 0.027 0.042 0.100 0.031 0.051 0.016 0.043 0.538 0.284 0.158 -4.40
Note: (1) Ritalin; (2) Methylin; (3) MPH-IR (Generics); (4) Ritalin SR/LA; (5) Metadate
ER/CD; (6) Methylin ER; (7) MPH-ER (Generics); (8) Concerta; (9) Adderall; (10) MAS-IR
(Generics); (11) Adderall XR.
By contrast, Table (6) lists the the substitution patterns corresponding to the multilevel AIDS model
described earlier. Observe that across the two types of models (random coefficients vs nested AIDS),
the own-price elasticity magnitudes decrease but the cross-price elasticity magnitudes generally
increase quite dramatically. Moreover, several of the cross-price elasticities, especially those for
drugs in the MPH-IR and MPH-ER segments are negative. The source of these negative cross-price
elasticities is due to the complementarities in the MPH segment noted earlier.
5.3. Merger Simulations. To understand how important the differences in the estimated substi-
tution patterns can be in the context of competition economics, we compare predicted percentage
change in prices of all drugs under three hypothetical mergers but based on elasticity estimates
from the last three models, i.e. simple logit, random coefficients logit, and nested AIDS models.
In the first hypothetical merger case, Novartis merges with Mallinckrodt. Novartis produces a 4-hr
and a 8-hr variant of Ritalin, which is an established and well known brand, while Mallinckrodt
competes with Novartis in both of these subsegments. Nonetheless, the market share by value of
each of these firms in 2003 is small (Novartis is 3.57% and Mallinckrodt is 1.9%) and would not
necessarily draw major scrutiny from competition authorities. For the second hypothetical merger,
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Table 6. Elasticities from Nested AIDS Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
MPH-IR (4hr drugs)
(1) -2.35 0.02 0.17 -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 -0.22 1.54 0.19 0.25 0.31
(2) 0.03 -0.64 -1.48 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.21 1.49 0.19 0.25 0.30
(3) 0.10 -0.59 -1.48 -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 -0.2 1.41 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPH-ER (8hr drugs)
(4) -0.21 -0.24 -0.57 -3.46 -0.05 0.91 0.20 2.21 0.20 0.26 0.31
(5) -0.24 -0.28 -0.67 -0.16 -2.38 -0.16 -0.14 2.61 0.23 0.31 0.37
(6) -0.19 -0.22 -0.52 2.42 -0.26 -3.30 -1.04 2.01 0.18 0.24 0.28
(7) -0.18 -0.21 -0.50 0.21 0.10 -0.26 -2.14 1.93 0.17 0.23 0.27
MPH-OROS (12hr drugs)
(8) 0.19 0.22 0.54 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.31 -3.02 0.21 0.27 0.33
MAS-IR (4hr drugs)
(9) 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.34 -2.52 1.06 0.10
(10) 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.36 0.75 -2.32 0.11
MAS-XR (12hr drugs)
(11) 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.40 0.02 0.03 -1.65
Note: (1) Ritalin; (2) Methylin; (3) MPH-IR (Generics); (4) Ritalin SR/LA; (5) Metadate
ER/CD; (6) Methylin ER; (7) MPH-ER (Generics); (8) Concerta; (9) Adderall; (10) MAS-IR
(Generics); (11) Adderall XR.
we consider a medium size merger, where Novartis with its small market share merges with Alza
with 26.10% share for its product Concerta. At the time, Alza was the only company selling the 12-
hr variant of the MPH molecule but it had no products in the competing segments of 4-hr and 8-hr
drugs within this molecule. Hence we consider a merger between Alza in the 12-hr segment in MPH
with Novartis providing 4-hr and 8-hr drugs. Such a merger would likely draw some attention from
competition authorities and invoke further investigation. The third and last hypothetical merger
we consider is between Alza and Shire. The market share of Shire through its three products
in competing molecule class of MAS and DEX was 26.89%. Also, Shire was the only other firm
producing a day-long drug, Adderall XR, albeit for a different molecule than Concerta. A proposed
merger between two largest firms would definitely be investigated by the competition authorities.
Our merger simulations are based on a Nash-Bertrand price competition model in the context of
multiproduct firms, where based on an estimated demand model, we first back out marginal costs
via an equilibrium price equation, and then use these costs to compute new prices under joint profit
maximization of co-owned products of the merging firms (see Nevo, 1998). To be clear, let there be
J related products where the unconditional demand for product j is given by
Qj = Dj(p1, . . . , pJ , Z) (16)
and where Z represents exogenous demand shift variables. If there are L firms, and the lth firm
produces a subset Ll of the products, then it maximizes over the sum of profits associated with
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each products as
Πl =
∑
r∈Ll
(pr − cr)Dr(p1, . . . , pJ , Z)
where cr is the constant marginal cost. Under Nash-Bertrand price competition, price pj of any
product j produced by firm l satisfies the first order conditions
Qj +
∑
r∈Ll
(pr − cr)∂Dr(p1, . . . , pJ , Z)
∂pj
= 0. (17)
If we let Θ be a 1/0 matrix with ones in the leading diagonal and in locations where a firm jointly
produces products r and j and define Ω such that Ωjr = −Θjr ∂Dr(p1,...,pJ ,Z)∂pj , then the first order
conditions imply a price equation (in matrix notation) of the form
p = c+ Ω−1D(p1, . . . , pJ , Z). (18)
(a) Novartis-Mallinckrodt (Logit) (b) Novartis-Alza (Logit) (c) Alza-Shire (Logit)
(d) Novartis-Mallinckrodt (RC-Logit) (e) Novartis-Alza (RC-Logit) (f) Alza-Shire (RC-Logit)
(g) Novartis-Mallinckrodt (AIDS) (h) Novartis-Alza (AIDS) (i) Alza-Shire (AIDS)
Figure 3. Predicted percentage price change
For each of the three models, we proceed as follows. Using demand parameters and data from 2003,
and the actual ownership matrix Θ, we back out the marginal cost for each product in each market
using equation (18) above. This calculation involves solving 17 linear equations in each market.
Next, change the ownership matrix to match one of the three hypothetical mergers given above.
Based on the estimates of marginal costs and the new ownership matrix, solve for new equilibrium
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prices in each market per equation (18) again. Since the markup term Ω−1D(p1, . . . , pJ , Z) is also a
function of the price vector, this requires solving a non-linear system of 17 equations per market.15
Table 7. Three Hypothetical Mergers
% Mean† Change in Price
2003 Data I. Novartis-Mallinckrodt II. Novartis-Alza III. Alza-Shire
Firm Product Price Share Logit RC-Logit AIDS Logit RC-Logit AIDS Logit RC-Logit AIDS
Novartis (1) Ritalin 52.41 0.88% 0.31 0.36 -0.73 1.72 1.85 8.11 0.01 -0.02 2.02
Mallinckrodt (2) Methylin 31.81 1.27% 0.64 0.68 -5.69 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.01 -0.02 2.29
19 firms (3) Generic MPH-IR 33.06 2.65% 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 2.20 0.02 -0.01 3.10
Novartis (4) Ritalin SR/LA 59.20 2.69% 0.27 0.30 6.87 1.52 1.65 12.29 0.01 -0.02 2.33
Celltech (5) Metadate CD/ER 57.18 2.61% 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 2.61 0.01 -0.02 3.13
Mallinckrodt (6) Methylin ER 52.29 0.63% 0.38 0.40 26.99 0.00 0.00 5.98 0.01 -0.02 2.69
15 firms (7) Generic MPH-ER 48.12 0.81% 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 2.39 0.00 -0.03 2.86
Alza/ (8) Concerta 96.45 26.10% 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.20 0.24 6.03 2.05 2.91 5.45
Shire (9) Adderall 31.87 2.94% 0.00 -0.08 0.09 0.01 -0.08 0.69 2.91 3.05 2.52
3 firms (10) Generic MAS-IR 26.52 7.61% 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.00 1.02 0.07 0.02 1.49
Shire (11) Adderall XR 52.58 23.78% 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.01 1.41 1.74 1.74 8.17
GSK (12) Dexedrine 34.94 0.19% 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.61
Shire (13) Dextrostat 23.25 0.17% 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.02 1.73 3.94 3.33 8.22
4 firms (14) Generic DEX-IR 24.62 0.40% 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 -0.03 1.59
GSK (15) Dexedrine SR 40.25 0.70% 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 -0.02 1.65
2 firms (16) Generic DEX-ER 35.14 1.10% 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.01 -0.02 1.77
11 firms (17) All Other drugs 85.18 25.48% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00
Average (Weighted) 0.02 0.02 0.49 0.11 0.12 2.62 1.03 1.26 3.91
†Mean is over all counties in 2003. For 95 percentile range see appendix.
The results of hypothetical mergers, i.e., predicted percentage change in price for drugs associated
with merging parties are summarized as 3×3 plots in Figure 3. The first column in the figure shows
the percentage price changes for four drugs owned by Novartis and Mallinckrodt (i.e., price changes
for drugs 1,2,4, and 6). The three rows summarize the distribution of price changes over the 778
15If the demand system is linear, these equations also become linear as then the slope matrix ∂Dr( )
∂pj
is not a function of
prices. For the multilevel AIDS model, we took advantage of this simplification by assuming that the overall unconditional
demand system is locally linear. Then by using the mean prices and shares/quantities in 2003, we converted the unconditional
elasticity matrix from multilevel AIDS model given in Table 6 to obtain estimates of intercepts and slopes for the linear
demand system. This simplification primarily allows us to avoid predicting quantities and relative and absolute shares (at
incremental price vector) using large number of demand equations associated with the multilevel AIDS system. We further
verified that this simplification does not lead to any major differences in the final results by subjecting the other two models
to the same linear simplification, i.e., by backing intercepts and slopes for the unconditional demand system by staring out
with the elasticity matrix from the other two models. The merger simulation results for the logit and random coefficients
logit models were very similar to when we use the correct non-linear system implied by the equation above or via this linear
unconditional demand. There were some additional (minor) changes made to the multilevel AIDS elasticity matrix for the
merger analysis. They do not change the main conclusions of this section and are described in the appendix.
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counties used in the simulations and across the three demand models. Similarly, the second and
third columns of the figure show distribution of prices changes for drugs associated with Novartis-
Alza (drugs 1,4, and 8) and Alza-Shire (drugs 8,9,11 and 13) mergers. The mean price changes for
all drugs, not just the drugs associated with the merging companies are summarized in Table (8)
(the 95 percentile interval for each drug and merger is given in the appendix). Under each merger,
the logit model predicts very small changes in the price of the drugs of the merging companies,
and almost none in the price of all other products. By comparison, the random coefficients model
predicts slightly larger changes in the prices of the drugs of the merging companies. In terms
of overall average price changes (weighted by share of sales pre-merger) the percentage change
across the two models is very similar in this application. However, the predicted price changes
are significantly much larger for the multilevel AIDS model and the distributions of changes are
quite different compared to the other two models, not only for the drugs of the merging companies
but also of other drugs with share weighted average ranging from 0.49 for the first (small) merger
to 3.91 for the third (large) merger. The exception is the first merger involving firms with small
market shares, but one that also involves drugs that are complementary segments. In this case,
the AIDS model predicts a small price decrease for some of the four hour drugs. More generally
though, under the third demand model the predicted prices changes of the merging parties as well
as of the competitors are both quite large.
5.4. Limitations. While the results above highlight comparisons across different demand specifi-
cations – which is the primary purpose of this paper – some limitations relating to the aggregate
nature of the data and the associated measurement of price in the presence of health insurance are
worth noting prior to using reported elasticities in other works.16
The price of a drug is computed using the ratio of revenue to quantity sold in a given county.
Revenue is the sum of monies received by retail pharmacies from all parties, and is inclusive of
co-pay from the patient, as well as payment from an insurance company or any third parties such
as Medicaid paying on behalf of the patient. In this respect it approximates the average transaction
price for the drug in a county. However, due to the presence of insurance, the actual price varies
across different payers (patient plus insurer) within a market. This is because Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (PBMs) make extensive use of multi-tiered formularies to control utilization, where brands
placed in tier-one have a smaller co-payment relative to those in higher tiers. In exchange for a
discount from a given manufacturer, a PBM can place a specific brand on tier-one with low co-pay,
while the competing brands may be on higher tiers and consequently require higher co-payments
(see Berndt and Newhouse, 2010). Similarly, a different insurance company in the same market
may have a different brand on tier-one. In turn this implies that the actual price of a product j
paid by payer n (i.e., patient-insurer combination in our context) differs from the average price in
16We are in debt to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this issue.
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an area t due to the presence of multi-tiered formularies in the US health insurance market.17 To
be clear, because of insurance formularies different consumers face different relative prices but in
the aggregate data it is assumed that all consumers within a market face the same relative prices.
An additional point worth acknowledging is that we have abstracted away from the agency problem
where physicians influence the choice of a given brand and are targeted by pharmaceuticals via
marketing, while the patient and insurer collectively pay for it. Even if physicians are assumed as
perfect agents, given that there are two payers, one can ask what does the area under the demand
curve represent? One way to think about the area under the demand curve is the sum of consumer
(patient) surplus plus that of the insurance company, and without explicit data on co-payments
for each sale it cannot be split into its two parts, i.e. how much of it is appropriated by insurers
relative to consumers. Nonetheless, the change in the sum of these two surpluses can still provide
a useful metric when considering the impact of a price change due to a policy or a merger on the
joint patient/insurerer consumer (see Branstetter, Chatterjee and Higgins, 2016, p.886, for a similar
interpretation).
To address these issues is beyond the scope of the current paper. Our goal was to use conventional
demand estimation techniques used in the empirical literature (e.g., Hausman and Leonard, 2005,
Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005) to highlight the importance of functional form in estimating demand,
and in simulating the price effects of mergers. In future research it would also be valuable to explore
the aggregation issues, and estimate demand using individual level data to examine the extent of
aggregation bias in estimating demand for pharmaceuticals.
6. Conclusion
For the ADHD data used in this paper, we believe that a flexible demand system such as AIDS is
more appropriate specification than a discrete choice model. As documented earlier, the data re-
quirements for estimating product space models are substantial and practical limitations may favor
the use of discrete choice models. However, as long as the analysis is for a handful of products, i.e.,
drugs within a narrowly defined therapeutic area, the problem of large number of parameters asso-
ciated with AIDS models may not be insurmountable. On the other hand, a discrete choice model
cannot, without some additional information, account for underlying complementarities which may
be important in some industries such as the pharmaceuticals (see for instance Gentzkow (2007)).
In the examples used in this paper, discrete choice models give very different, and typically smaller,
predicted changes in prices for merging drugs as well as for the competitors’ drugs than the AIDS
17The average price problem we discuss here is common to all papers that use similarly aggregated data, but where price
varies by individuals due to insurance or other discounts to the payers. Examples from pharmaceuticals from the US with
aggregate data include (among others) Ellison et al. (1997), Cleanthous (2002), Branstetter, Chatterjee and Higgins (2016),
Minjae, Nicholson and Lucarelli (2017).
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models. They can also miss a decrease in prices that may follow in case of complementarities. These
differences across models are driven by both the magnitude and sign of cross-price elasticities.
Our results (for the magnitude at least) are consistent with the one reported in Weinberg and
Hosken (2013) who also find that merger predictions were larger for AIDS demand compared to the
logit models. Insights from our work also provide a potential explanation for merger results reported
in Bjo¨rnerstedt and Verboven (2016). They use nested logit models to predict post-merger prices
in the Swedish analgesics market, and compare them to observed prices post an actual merger.
The authors report that while overall the simulations were quite successful in terms of closeness
between predicted and true price changes, nonetheless the simulations slightly under-predicted the
price increase for the merging firms, and significantly under-predicted the price increase by the
non-merging competitors. We also find that predicted price increase for the hypothetical merger
for some of the non-merging competitors is considerably larger under AIDS than for the other two
models. Thus we conjecture that the differences between true and predicted price changes observed
in the Swedish analgesics market may be similar to the one we observe here between discrete choice
and AIDS models, and may be related to the difference in magnitude of cross-price elasticities across
these models.
On the flip side however, the magnitude of the cross-price elasticities in AIDS models can be
too ‘large’, in the sense that they may lead to the failure of second order conditions for profit
maximization not holding in merger simulations. This can happen for instance when the sum of
the cross-price elasticities is larger than the own-price elasticities, and the ownership matrix also
mostly consists of ones in the off-diagonals (this potential problem does not occur in logit or random
coefficients models as severely). While predicted price changes are unlikely to be the only factor
a competition authority would consider when deliberating a merger, nonetheless, these examples
show that multilevel AIDS model can give very different estimates from discrete choice models.
The results of this paper are meant to serve as a cautionary tale when using merger simulations,
as choice of the demand model matters, and not an overall indictment against them or against any
one type of demand models.
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Appendix
Simulation Details. The elasticity matrix for the multilevel AIDS was modified in three ways
before using it for merger analysis. First, if the cross-elasticity estimate was not statistically signif-
icantly different from zero, then we set it to zero before the merger analysis. This did not change
the results in any appreciable manner for the mergers considered here, except that price changes
in the third merger were even larger with average price change being 5.10% instead of 3.91% as
reported in the paper. Second, the own-price elasticity of drug (2), Methylin by Mallinckrodt, was
estimated to be in the inelastic region (η2,2 = −0.64). Using this estimate as is, leads to negative
estimates of marginal costs for this drug. Since it is otherwise very similar to generic versions of
MPH-IR, and indeed itself is almost a generic in terms of brand recognition and prices, we assumed
that its marginal cost would be similar to that of the other generics in this segment. Hence to
overcome this difficulty, we set its own-price elasticity to be the same as that of generic MPH-IR.
This modification leads to some modest differences in merger predicted prices, particularly in the
first hypothetical merger case as it involves merger between this firm and Novartis. Overall average
price change is only 0.16% for the first merger (instead of 0.49% as reported in the paper) if we do
not make change. Third, we set the cross-price elasticity of drug (17) to zero. If we do not make this
change (but continue to make the other two changes), results for average percentage change in prices
are even larger than those reported in the paper for all three mergers. This change was necessary
because, as documented in Bokhari and Fournier (2013), demand for this last drug is measured
very imprecisely and small changes in the underlying model specification change the cross-price
elasticity for this drug with the other 16 drugs substantially. Thus we set the off-diagonal in the
elasticity matrix associated with drug 17 to zero so that when the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium prices
are computed for the remaining 16 drugs under a merger scenario, the cross-effects with drug 17
would not impact those calculations. Consequently, the price change in drug 17 is also zero under
all three scenarios.
31
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Table 8. Three Hypothetical Mergers
% Change in Price — 95 Percentile Range
I. Novartis-Mallinckrodt II. Novartis-Alza III. Alza-Shire
Firm Drug # Logit RC-Logit AIDS Logit RC-Logit AIDS Logit RC-Logit AIDS
Novartis (1) [.05,.85] [.05,1.06] [-1.03,-0.48] [.77,3.10] [.83,3.38] [5.48,11.3] [.00,.02] [-.07,.01] [1.05,2.84]
Mallinckrodt (2) [.15,1.54] [.16,1.59] [-10.6,-3.09] [.00,.01] [-.00,.01] [0.75,2.87] [.00,.04] [-.07,.02] [1.12,4.03]
19 firms (3) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.21,0.88] [.00,.01] [-.00,.01] [1.16,3.49] [.00,.04] [-.06,.03] [1.59,4.51]
Novartis (4) [.04,.79] [.05,.86] [3.92,10.35] [.60,2.75] [.68,3.02] [8.55,16.19] [.00,.02] [-.10,.01] [1.15,3.31]
Celltech (5) [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.33,0.72] [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [1.47,3.46] [.00,.02] [-.10,.00] [1.55,4.47]
Mallinckrodt (6) [.10,.82] [.12,.90] [16.0,40.6] [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [4.40,8.75] [.00,.02] [-.08,.01] [1.31,4.15]
15 firms (7) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.30,0.74] [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [1.39,3.61] [.00,.01] [-.09,.00] [1.44,4.31]
Alza/ (8) [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.29,0.61] [.06,.43] [.08,.60] [3.68,7.85] [1.01,3.27] [1.13,5.17] [2.17,8.04]
Shire (9) [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.06,0.13] [.00,.03] [-.02,.03] [0.44,0.92] [1.17,5.45] [1.25,5.95] [1.46,3.76]
3 firms (10) [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.09,0.20] [.00,.02] [-.01,.02] [0.67,1.36] [.02,.16] [-.15,.15] [0.81,2.16]
Shire (11) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.13,0.26] [.00,.02] [.00,.02] [0.94,1.77] [.76,3.07] [.68,3.31] [5.89,10.8]
GSK (12) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.01,0.03] [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.10,0.19] [.00,.01] [-.07,.01] [0.46,0.78]
Shire (13) [.00,.01] [.00,.01] [0.14,0.35] [.00,.05] [.00,.05] [1.19,2.31] [1.77,7.26] [1.35,6.19] [5.87,10.7]
4 firms (14) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.03,0.08] [.00,.00] [-.00,.01] [0.26,0.53] [.00,.01] [-.09,.01] [1.20,2.15]
GSK (15) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.03,0.08] [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.25,0.54] [.00,.01] [-.08,.01] [1.20,2.14]
2 firms (16) [.00,.00] [-.00,.00] [0.04,0.08] [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.29,0.56] [.00,.02] [-.07,.01] [1.28,2.26]
11 firms (17) [.00,.00] [-.01,.00] [0.00,0.00] [.00,.01] [-.02,.01] [0.00,0.00] [.01,.05] [-.13,.04] [0.00,0.00]
Note: (1) Ritalin; (2) Methylin; (3) MPH-IR (Generics); (4) Ritalin SR/LA; (5) Metadate ER/CD; (6) Methylin ER; (7)
MPH-ER (Generics); (8) Concerta; (9) Adderall; (10) MAS-IR (Generics); (11) Adderall XR.
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